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Branti v. Finkel: A Fresh Look At The
Spoils System
Patronage' and the spoils system date back to the very beginning of this country's existence.2 The use of patronage has invoked
various responses throughout its history.' This note will discuss
the constitutionality of patronage dismissals.4 The Supreme Court
has long regarded the use of patronage as an interference with first
amendment freedoms.'
There are many prices we pay for the freedom secured by the first
amendment; the risk of undue influence is one of them, confirming what we have long known: freedom is hazardous, but some
1. Patronage has been defined as the "allocation of the discretionary favors
of government in exchange for political support." M. TOLCHIN & S. TOLCHIN, To
THE VICTOR at 323 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as TOLCHIN].
2. For a discussion of patronage practices in the United States see TOLCHIN,
supra note 1; C. FISH, THE CivEi. SERVICE AND PATRONAGE (1905); Sorauf, Patronage and Party, 3

MIDWEST

J.

OF POL.

ScI. 115 (1959); D.

ROSENBLOOM,

FED-

(1971); Scott, Corruption, Machine Politics,
and Political Change, 63 AMER. POL. Sci. REV. 1142 (1969).
3. Although George Washington, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson made
limited use of patronage appointments, it was not until the Presidencies of Jackson and Lincoln that the practice became widespread. Eventually, the practice
became so pervasive and corrupt that reforms were necessary. The Pendleton Act,
ch.27,22 Stat.403 (1883), established a federal civil service where appointments
and dismissals were done on a non-partisan basis. Later, the Hatch Act, ch.410, 53
Stat.1147 (1939) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.§5) limited federal employee's political activity. These restrictions were later extended to state and local
government employees. For a listing of these "Little Hatch Acts" see Broaderick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 501, 601 n.2 (1973). The constitutionality of the Hatch Act
was upheld by the Supreme Court in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75 (1947).
4. Public employment is only one form of patronage. Party faithful may also
receive such benefits as public contracts for defense, highway, and building
projects; tax abatements; judgeships and other courtroom patronage such as receiverships and trusteeships; improved public services for cooperative wards; and
assistance in navigating "the maze of federal and state bureaucracy to obtain the
far-ranging services to which they are entitled." TOLCHIN, supra note 1.
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. I provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people to peacefully assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
ERAL SERVICE AND THE CONSTITUTION
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restraints are worse. 6

The Supreme Court, in Branti v. Finkel,7 reduced restraints
on the first amendment by holding that a public employee could
not be discharged solely because of his choice of political party if
such affiliation would not affect the performance of the public office involved. The significance of the Branti decision lies in the
Court's expansion of the protective coverage supplied in Elrod v.
Burns8 to reach indirect methods of coercion that control a public
employee's freedom of choice.
This note will focus on two aspects of the Branti decision.
First, the role of the first amendment and its applicability to patronage dismissals will be examined. Second, the Court's modification of the Elrod decision will be analyzed in light of the new standard adopted by the Court.
THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Aaron Finkel and Alan Tabakman, assistant public defenders
in Rockland County, New York, were dismissed by petitioner
Branti, County Public Defender, when control of the county legislature shifted from the Republican to the Democratic party.9 Fin6. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 256-57 (1957) (Burger, C.J., dissenting in
part).
7. 100 S. Ct. 1287 (1980).
8. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). The Court held that nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential employees could not be dismissed for purely partisan reasons.
9. The Rockland County Public Defender is appointed by the county legislature for a term of six years and he, in turn, appoints the assistant public defenders. Public employees in Rockland County are categorized as either "unclassified"
or "classified." Unclassified positions include teachers, elected officials, legislators,
and the District Attorney. Classified positions consist of four subdivisions:
a) A competitive class with minimum qualifications and competitive
civil service examinations;
b) A non-competitive class with minimum qualifications but no
examination;
c) A labor class, consisting of unskilled labor;
d) An exempt class, for which no examination is deemed practicable or
feasible.
Since there is no executive in Rockland County, the legislature performs the
function of executive. The legislature appoints the department heads, and members of the exempt class are generally appointed by a department head. Assistant
county attorneys and assistant public defenders fall into the exempt class. These
appointments were determined by a Democratic caucus after the 1977 elections
delivered a Democratic majority. The district court found that the selection process employed, in appointing the nine assistant public defenders, eliminated from
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kel and Tabakman alleged that they were nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employees who were satisfactorily performing their duties, and, therefore, the politically motivated dismissal violated the first and fourteenth amendments. 10
The district court held that the dismissals would be allowed
pursuant to Elrod only if assistant public defenders were the type
of policymaking, confidential employees who may be discharged
solely on the basis of their political affiliations." The district court,
after considering the facts, decided that the respondents did not
fall within this category"2 and, therefore, the dismissal violated
first and fourteenth amendment principles. The court of appeals
affirmed the district court's decision that an assistant public de8
fender was neither a policymaker nor a confidential employee.'
consideration candidates who were affiliated with the Republican Party. The only
non-Republican considered was unregistered and spoke Spanish. The district
court found that Branti's only reason for terminating their employment was that
they "were not'recommended or sponsored pursuant to the procedures that had
been decided upon by the Democratic Caucus." 457 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
10. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, §1 provides in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
11. 457 F. Supp. at 1285. Upon assuming office, Sheriff Elrod summarily dismissed or threatened with dismissal four non-civil service employees. The employees' positions were: a chief deputy in the Process Division of the Sheriff's
Office; a juvenile court security guard and bailiff; a process server; and an office
employee. Since these employees refused to affiliate with or to obtain sponsorship
from the Democratic Party, Elrod sought to have them discharged. The Supreme
Court found that such patronage dismissals infringe on first amendment freedoms
of political belief and association. In that context, the Court held that, except
with regard to policy-making public employees, the defendants had failed to
demonstrate an overriding governmental interest which would justify such interference with first amendment rights. 427 U.S. at 372-73.
12. 457 F. Supp. at 1291. The district court began its assessment of whether
or not the plaintiffs were policymakers within the guidelines applied in Elrod.
The court first considered whether plaintiffs had responsibilities that were not
well defined or that were of a broad scope, and, second, whether the plaintiffs
formulated or implemented broad goals.
Next, the district court considered Ramey v. Harber, 431 F. Supp. 657 (W.D.
Va. 1977), in which a policymaker was defined as "one who controls or exercises a
role in the decision-making process as to the goals and general operating procedure of the office." Id. at 666 n.15.
13. 598 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT OPINION

The Supreme Court in Branti held that a public employee
could not be discharged solely because of his choice of political
party. In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered whether
the employees in question were impermissibly discharged under
the doctrine of Elrod and whether the hiring authority had sufficiently demonstrated that party affiliation was an appropriate requirement for the position. This analysis will discuss the role of
the first amendment in the patronage context as established in
Elrod and further developed by Branti. The Branti Court's new
standard for determining the constitutionality of patronage practices and its modification of the Elrod standard will then be
evaluated.
The Role of the First Amendment
The first amendment was first applied to patronage dismissals
in the Elrod decision. The Branti Court adopted Justice Brennan's
conclusion in Elrod;1 the constitutionality of patronage dismissals
is to be determined by the rule established in Board of Education
8 Although the facts
v. Barnette."
of the Barnette case did not concern political patronage," the Court there held that the Bill of
Rights prohibited attempts of public officials to coerce or interfere
with the public's beliefs.17 Justice Brennan, speaking for the plurality in Elrod, stated that the practice of patronage dismissals interferes with the employee's first amendment rights of political belief and association." Political belief and association has been held
to constitute the core of those activities protected by the first
14. 100 S. Ct. 1292.
15. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

16. In Barnette, the Court held that the action of a state legislature compelling a flag salute and a pledge of each public school student went beyond constitutional limitations and invaded the "sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the
purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official
control." Id. at 642.
17. Justice Jackson, writing for the plurality in Barnette, stated the rule
eloquently:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.
Id.
18. 427 U.S. at 356.
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amendment."' Justice Brennan elaborated by stating that the practice of patronage dismissals abridges these first amendment rights
by forcing employees to join or support the party in power in order
to retain their jobs.2 In concluding his analysis in Elrod, Justice
Brennan stated that the inevitable tendency of such a system is to
coerce employees into compromising their true beliefs.2 ' According
to Justice Brennan, this impact on freedom of association and belief could distort the electoral process.2 2
In addition to the potentially harmful effect the political patronage system may have on the democratic system as a whole,
Justice Brennan emphasized in Elrod that the practice had the effect of imposing an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a
public benefit. 2 Briefly stated, the doctrine of "unconstitutional
19. Id.

Id.

20. 427 U.S. at 355-56. Justice Brennan continued:
An individual who is a member of the out-party maintains affiliation
with his own party at the risk of losing his job. He works for the election
of his party's candidates and espouses its policies at the same risk. The
financial and campaign assistance that he is induced to provide another
party furthers the advancement of that party's policies to the detriment
of his party's views and ultimately his own beliefs, and any assessment of
his salary is tantamount to coerced belief. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 19 (1976). Even a pledge of allegiance to another party, however ostensible, only serves to compromise the individual's true beliefs. Since the
average public employee is hardly in the financial position to support his
party and another, or to lend his time to two parties, the individual's
ability to act according to his beliefs and to associate with others of his
political persuasion is constrained, and support for his party is
diminished.

21. Given the increasingly pervasive character of government employment,
the power to starve political opposition by commanding partisan support,
financial or otherwise, may have a significant impact on the formation and expression of political beliefs. 427 U.S. at 356.
22. Justice Brennan stated in Elrod, 427 U.S. at 357, citing inter alia Illinois
State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 576 (7th Cir. 1972), that
"[platronage, .

.

. to the extent it compels or restrains belief and association, is

inimical to the process which undergirds our system of government and is at war
with the deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the first amendment."
23. The doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" was most clearly stated in
the commerce clause case, Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission,
271 U.S. 583 (1926). In that case, a California statute required that a certificate of
public convenience and necessity be obtained by private carriers from the Railroad Commission. This requirement, in effect, subjected private carriers to all the
Commission rules and regulations applicable to public carriers. The Frost Court
stated:
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conditions" holds that "whatever an express constitutional provi-

sion prevents the government from doing directly it forbids the
government from doing indirectly. 2 4 This doctrine has been most
frequently applied to protect first amendment rights.2 5 The principle, therefore, is particularly applicable to patronage dismissals. In
the patronage context, it must first be determined whether the em-

ployee's job is a benefit of the type that cannot be subjected to an
unconstitutional condition. Traditionally, the right-privilege dis-

tinction barred a public employee's constitutional claim for relief.2 6
It was believed that a public job was a privilege, therefore not deIt would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of
rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by
which the same result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a
right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as
a general rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may
grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of
the state in that respect is not unlimited; and one of the limitations is
that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of
constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a
surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guarantees embedded in the
Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of
existence.
Id. at 593-94.
24. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HAuv. L. REv. 1439, 1445-46 (1968).
25. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (plaintiff's dismissal from teaching job for criticism of
school administration violated freedom of speech); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360
(1964) (loyalty oath required of state employees held overbroad and an unconstitutional condition upon employment); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1960)
(state could not deny appellant office to which he was appointed on basis of his
refusal to declare belief in God); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L.
REv. 1595 (1960). See also, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)
(the theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected); Bruff, Unconstitutional Conditions Upon Public Employment: New Departures in the Protection of First Amendment Rights, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 129
(1969); French, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEo. L.J. 234
(1961); Note, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REy.
144 (1968).
26. See Comment, PatronageDismissals: Constitutional Limits and Political Justifications, 41 UNIV. CHi. L. REv. 297, 307 (1974).

[1980:103]

SPOILS SYSTEM

serving of constitutional protection."
The right-privilege distinction was rejected by the Supreme
Court in Board of Regents v. Roth2 8 and Perry v. Sindermann.2
Although Perry was primarily concerned with principles underlying the grant or denial of procedural due process, the Branti Court
was particularly interested in the Perry Court's interpretation of
the unconstitutional conditioning of public employment in the patronage context.3 0 Perry held that even a public servant with no
constitutional or statutory rights to his job could not be dismissed
simply for exercising his first amendment rights. However, he may
be summarily dismissed without a hearing or statement of reasons."1 The Court cited two other cases, Shelton v. Tucker"2 and
Keyishan v. Board of Regents,"3 in reaffirming the principle that
public employment, even of nontenured employees, is a benefit
27. The most quoted opinion supporting the "no right to public employment" analysis is McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517
(1892), in which Justice Holmes wrote that "[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no right to be a policeman." Id. at 220, 29
N.E. at 517.
28. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
29. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). In Perry, respondent was employed under a series of
one year contracts in a state college system with no formal tenure. When the Regents decided not to renew his contract, he filed suit alleging that the decision was
based upon his public criticism of the college administration and thus violated his
first amendment rights. The Court held that if the statements were the basis for
dismissal, his rights had been infringed. Respondent was entitled to a hearing at
which he could offer proof of an impermissible basis for his dismissal. Id. at 597.
30. The Court stated:
[Government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests - especially, his interest in
freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his
exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.
This would allow the government to produce a result which [it] could not
command directly. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526. Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible.
100 S. Ct. at 293.
31. 408 U.S. at 596-98.
32. 364 U.S. 479 (1960). In Shelton, a state statute, compelling every teacher
to file annually an affidavit listing all memberships in and contributions to organizations, was held invalid as overbroad in impairing the freedom of association of
teachers hired on a year-to-year basis.
33. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). The Court found the New York Feinberg Law to be
overbroad and unconstitutional. The Court rejected the premise that "public employment . . . may be conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights
which could not be abridged by direct government action." Id. at 615.
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that triggers the unconstitutional condition analysis. Together,
Perry, Shelton, and Keyishian indicate that the government may
not deny a benefit such as public employment merely on the basis
of political affiliation. Patronage dismissals clearly restrict activities protected by the first amendment.
The Branti Court expands upon this first amendment analysis
by declaring, "[i]f the first amendment protects a public employee
from discharge based on what he has said, it must also protect him
from discharge based on what he believes. 3 4 The Court relied on
three cases as authority for its holding that patronage dismissals of
public employees violate the first amendment: United Public
Workers v. Mitchellos" Wiemann v. Updegraf,ss and Cafeteria &
Restaurant Workers v. McElroy. 7 The Court cited dicta from each
of the three cases which tended to show that political affiliation is
not a valid condition to public employment.38 The Branti Court
interpreted Mitchell, Wieman, and Cafeteria Workers to hold that
political affiliation could not be the sole basis for denial of public
employment unless the government could demonstrate an overriding interest.8 ' However, the theory that patronage dismissals impinge on first amendment freedoms is not without serious objection.40 Justice Powell in his Elrod dissent contended that no first
34. 100 S.Ct. at 1293.
35. 330 U.S. 75 (1947). In Mitchell, federal employees unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of the Hatch Act; see note 3 supra.
36. 344 U.S. 183 (1952). The Wieman Court held an Oklahoma statute unconstitutional which required every state employee to sign an oath that he did not
belong either to a Communist front organization or a subversive group.
37. 367 U.S. 886 (1961). In Cafeteria Workers, the Court held that the summary revocation of the security clearance of a civilian employee on a Naval installation did not violate her right to due process.
38. In Mitchell, the Court stated that "Congress may not enact a regulation
providing that no Republican, Jew, or Negro shall be appointed to a federal office .... None would deny such limitations .... "330 U.S. at 100. This principle
was reaffirmed in Weiman. The Court in Cafeteria Workers concluded that " ...
Rachel Brawner could not constitutionally have been excluded from the Gun Factory ...

because she was a Democrat or a Methodist." 367 U.S. at 898.

39. 100 S.Ct. at 1293.
40. Justice Powell, dissenting in Branti, contended that the majority was incorrect in concluding "that the First Amendment prohibits the use of membership in a national political party as a criterion for the dismissal of public employees." Id. at 1298 (Powell, J. dissenting).
Justice Powell suggested that the Court's reliance on Barnette, Perry, and
Keyishian is without precedence since issues concerning patronage were not discussed in those cases. Justice Powell, while reviewing the factual settings of these
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amendment rights are violated when public employees lose their
positions obtained through participation in the patronage system.4
Before concluding its first amendment analysis, the Branti
Court revealed that the coercive effect of patronage systems was an
influential factor in its decision. The Court rejected the argument
that Elrod only prohibited dismissals resulting from an employee's
failure to succumb to political coercion.4 2 To limit Elrod to this
extent, the Court suggested, would virtually overrule the principles
established in Elrod. The Court stated emphatically, "[w]hile it
would perhaps eliminate the more blatant forms of coercion described in Elrod, it would not eliminate the coercion of belief that
necessarily flows from the knowledge that one must have a sponsor
'4
in the dominant party in order to retain one's job." 3
The type of coercion the Branti Court was concerned with was
not the actual job loss" of the employee; rather, it was the fact
that the threat of job loss would force employees to change their
political affiliation. 4 The Branti Court re-examined Brennan's observations in Elrod that political sponsorship is often purchased at
the price of political contributions or campaign work in addition
to a simple declaration of allegiance to the party. The Court conopinions, focused only on the narrow facts and holdings of the cases. Justice Powell stated that, "Board of Education v.Barnett, . . . did not involve public employment. In that case, the Court declared that a state statute compelling each
public school student to pledge allegiance to the flag violated the First Amendment." Id. at 1299 n.7 (Powell, J. dissenting).
Justice Powell believed that the constitutionality of appointing or dismissing
public employees should depend on the governmental interests served by patronage. Citing Buckley, Justice Powell states, "[n]o constitutional violation exists
if patronage practices further sufficiently important interests to justify tangential
burdening of First Amendment rights." Id. at 1299. Therefore, according to Justice Powell, the appropriateness of party affiliation for some government positions
could not be "answered in a principled manner without identifying and weighing
the governmental interest served by patronage." Id.
41. 427 U.S. at 380-81 (Powell, J. dissenting). Only requests that the employee change his political affiliation, contribute to, or work for the party's candidates should bring the action within the rule of Elrod.
42. 100 S. Ct. at 1293-94.
43. Id.
44. See GREENSTONE AND PETERSON, REFORMERS, MACHINES, AND THE WAR ON
POVERTY IN CITY POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY, 267-73 (J. Q. Wilson ed. 1968);
Note, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 58, 190 (1976).
45. Finkel had changed his party registration from Republican to Democratic
in 1977 hoping to increase his chances of being reappointed by the new Democratic public defender.
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cluded that the realization that one must have a sponsor in order
to retain one's job is very likely to lead to the same type of coercion as that described by the plurality in Elrod."'
The facts in Elrod involved direct coercion: a demand that the
employees in question change their party affiliation or face discharge. The Court in Branti curtailed a more elusive strain of coercion. The type of coercion discussed in Branti forces employees to
change their beliefs or associations through an unspoken threat of
discharge. Although Branti did not demand that Finkel change his
party registration, the change was made for no reason other than
to avoid discharge.' 7 This is an example of how an indirect threat
to employment can be transformed into overt political pressure.
Therefore, by making it known that employment is conditioned
upon membership to the in-party, the patronage system is able to
manipulate public employee's beliefs and associations in violation
of their first amendment rights. The Court in Branti extends the
Elrod holding to cover a wider range of coercive practices affecting
a person's first amendment rights of belief and association.
The Standard Adopted by the Court
Although the Court in Branti applied the first amendment
analysis employed in Elrod, the plurality did not follow Elrod's
test for determining whether patronage firings impose an impermissible burden.48 The standard the Branti Court adopted places
the burden on the hiring authority to demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance
9
of the public office involved.4

The decision in Branti set forth several factors to be considered in determining whether political affiliation is an appropriate
basis for dismissal of a government employee. The employee's responsibilities, primary duties, capacity for policy making, or confidential relationship are all to be given relatively equal weight in
the determination." The Court considered the appropriateness of
46. 100 S. Ct. at 1294 n.11.

47. Id. at 1290 n.4.
48. The test the Elrod Court created was in line with the traditional analysis
of first amendment cases. The Court defined the test as follows: the practice must
"further some vital government end by a means that is least restrictive of freedom
of belief and association in achieving that end, and the benefit gained must outweigh the loss of constitutionally protected rights." 427 U.S. at 363.
49. 100 S. Ct. at 1295.
50. In Elrod, the Court stated that the nature of an employee's responsibili-
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party affiliation for various types of employees" and found an obvious example in state election laws which require precincts to be
supervised by two election judges of different parties.52
However, the selection of a state university's football coach,
although involving policy considerations, could not appropriately
be based upon political affiliations.5 3 The Court further illustrated
the distinction by setting forth the example of a state governor
who may consider party affiliation when choosing assistants who
help him write speeches, explain his views to the press, or act as
his legislative liaison.5 The Court stated that the assistants who
perform these official duties could not perform their functions effectively unless they shared the same political beliefs and party
commitments as their superior.5 5
ties were critical in determining whether an employee was nonpolicymaking and
thus protected from dismissal. The Court elaborated by stating:
Employee supervisors ... may have many responsibilities, but those responsibilities may have only limited and well-defined objectives. An employee with responsibilities that are not well-defined or are of a broad
scope more likely functions in a policymaking position.
427 U.S. at 367-68.
51. According to the Branti Court, the duties of the employees in question,
the chief deputy of the process division of the sheriff's office and a bailiff and a
security guard at the Juvenile Court of Cook County, were clearly not the type for
which party affiliation would be appropriate. 100 S. Ct. at 1294.
52. Most state laws require that the judges supervising an election be of different political parties in order to ensure fairness and adequate supervision of
each side. Justice Powell, in his dissent, found this example unclear:
If the mere presence of a state law mandating political affiliation as a
requirement for public employment were sufficient, then the legislature
of Rockland County could reverse the results of this case merely by passing a law mandating that political affiliation be considered when a Public
Defender chooses his assistants.
Id. at 1297 n.3 (Powell, J. dissenting).
53. Id. at 1295.
54. Id.
55. Id. It has been recognized that the patronage system helps ensure that
the policies and goals of the in-party are not undermined by insubordination and
obstructionist acts of the out-party members. Patronage has also been touted for
guaranteeing that subordinates will not attempt to discredit the party or sabotage
its programs and that such employees will be more responsive to their superiors
because they risk summary dismissal for insubordination. See, e.g., Shoen, Politics, Patronage, and the Constitution, 3 IND. LEG. F. 35, 91 (1969); Grossman,
Public Employment and Free Speech: Can They be Reconciled?, 24 AD. L. REV.
109, 118 (1972); O'Neil, Politics, Patronage and Public Employment, 44 U. CIN.
L. REV. 725, 737-38 (1975); Note, The First Amendment and Public Employees An Emerging Constitutional Right to be a Policeman?, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
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Applying these examples to the facts in Branti, the Court concluded that the employment of an assistant public defender could
not be conditioned upon party affiliation. The Court elaborated by
stating:
it is manifest that the continued employment of an assistant public defender cannot properly be conditioned upon his allegiance to
the political party in control of the county government. The primary, if not the only, responsibility of an assistant public defender is to represent individual citizens in controversy with the
state."
The Court paralleled the duties of an assistant public defender to
those of counsel appointed to represent indigent defendants in federal criminal proceedings. The Court determined that the principal
responsibility of appointed counsel was to serve the interests of his
client.5 7 It is significant to note that in reaching its conclusion, the
409, 422 (1968); Note, A Constitutional Analysis of the Spoils, System - The Judiciary Visits Patronage Place, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1320, 1321 n.12 (1972); Comment, Patronage Dismissals: Constitutional Limits and Political Justifications,
41 U. Cm. L. REv. 297, 319-20 (1974); Note, The Spoils System: Ripe for Justiciability?, 34 U. Pirr. L. REV. 699, 710 (1973); Note, The Supreme Court, 1975
Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 58, 194 (1976).
56. 56 S. Ct. at 1295. Although the Branti Court determined that the labels
of "policymaker" or "confidential" were only peripheral considerations, the Court
did contrast and analogize the responsibilities of an assistant public defender with
those of a prosecutor and counsel appointed to represent indigent defendants in
federal criminal proceedings. Although the Court specifically reserved opinion as
to whether the deputy of a prosecutor would be protected from patronage dismissals their denial of certiorari in Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 68, may reflect their inclinations. Newcomb was a
deputy city attorney and, as such, he stood in a pctsition between the city attorney
and the assistant city attorneys. He was dismissed from his appointed position
due to his plans to run for Congress. Newcomb charged that his superior, the city
attorney, and the incumbent congressman conspired to coerce him into withdrawing from the race. The court of appeals permitted a supervisor to discharge any
employee occupying a sensitive policymaking position if the employee's activity
could be classified as an expression of personal or political disloyalty. Newcomb
was labeled a policymaker by the district court based on three facts: the deputy
city attorney was exempted from civil service, he had no established term of office, and he had broad powers and duties. Id. at 827.
The Court in Newcomb distinguished its decision from Elrod on the assumption that Newcomb would "by the nature of his political affiliation, retard the
effectuation of a new administration's policies." Id. at 830.
57. The Court was citing language from Ferri v. Ackerman, 100 S. Ct. 402
(1980), in which the Supreme Court held that an attorney appointed by a federal
judge to represent indigent criminal defendants is not, as a matter of federal law,

[1980:1031

SPOILS SYSTEM

Branti Court considered the responsibilities of the particular office
involved in the same manner as the Elrod Court determined
whether a certain office involved policymaking or confidential positions. The standard that the Court adopted did involve a discussion of the criteria for policymaking and confidentiality suggesting
perhaps that they may still be relevant factors. 58 However, Branti
broadened the Elrod standard in that "policymaker" or "confidential relationship" now seem to be only peripheral considerations.
It should be noted, however, that the Branti Court adopted
the Elrod stipulation that if an "employee's private political beliefs
would interfere with the discharge of his public duties, his First
Amendment rights may be required to yield to the State's vital
interest in maintaining governmental effectiveness and efficiency."5 Therefore, the Court implied that a balancing test might
be utilized if the facts of later cases come too close to the fine line
separating those positions for which party affiliation is deemed appropriate and those for which it is not.
If the Court did engage in a balancing process, the asserted
governmental interest would have to be weighed against the severity of the encroachment on the employee's first amendment
rights.6" The Court would also consider the possibility of less drastic methods for achieving the governmental interest asserted.
While the Court has occasionally found the governmental interest
entitled to absolute immunity in a subsequent state malpractice suit brought
against him by his former client. The Ferri Court agreed that an "indispensable
element of the effective performance of his responsibilities is the ability to act
independently of the government and to oppose it in adversary litigation." Id. at
409.
However, Justice Stewart, in his Branti dissent, believed that the analogy of
a public defender and his assistants to a firm of lawyers in the private sector was
particularly appropriate due to the necessity of mutual confidence and trust inherent in that kind of professional association. 100 S. Ct. at 1296 (Stewart, J.
dissenting).
58. The Court noted that any policymaking or confidential relationship that
occurred in the public defender's exercise of his duties would relate to the needs
of his clients and not to partisan political interests.
59. 100 S. Ct. at 1294, citing 427 U.S. at 366. The Court was not persuaded
by the argument that patronage insures effective government and the efficiency of
public employees. Rather, the Court stated, "[tihe inefficiency resulting from the
wholesale replacement of public employees every time political office changes
hands belies this justification." Id.
60. For another view on the Court's approach to balancing, see Note, Constitutional Law - Elrod v.Burns: Patronagein Public Employment, 13 WAKE FOREST L. Rsv. 175, 182 (1977).
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sufficiently compelling, 1 it has more recently found that less drastic means exist for insuring government effectiveness and employee
s
efficiency 62
THE FUTURE OF PATRONAGE

There is much speculation that the expansion of the merit sys-

tem's and decisions such as Branti will create fundamental
changes in the operation of political parties as we know them today. In his dissent, Justice Powell believed the Branti decision
dealt a death blow to political parties. 64 In his view, political par-

ties are an essental element of the patronage system." According

to Justice Powell, political parties, through the patronage system,
serve a variety of governmental interests and without them our

representative form of government would be hampered. Justice
Powell enumerated the various services political parties perform. 6

If political parties cannot offer patronage positions to their party
faithful, the result, according to Justice Powell, will be a breakdown of party discipline on the national level.6 7 Justice Powell as-

serted that such a breakdown would inhibit the voter's ability to
hold parties responsible for the performance of its elected officials

and would open the door for other forces to further inhibit the
proper functioning of government.66 Justice Powell was specifically

61. See CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); United Public Workers
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). Both of these cases involved legislative restraints

on political management and campaigning by public employees.
62. In Elrod, the Court noted that employees could be discharged for good
cause if they were insubordinate or performed poorly. 427 U.S. at 366.
63. For a general discussion on the decline of patronage due to the merit
system, see D. ROSENBLOOM, FEDERAL SERVICE AND THE CONSTITUTION (1971); P.
VAN RIPER, HISTORY OF THE U.S. CIVIL SERVICE

(1958).

64. Justice Powell begins his dissent in Branti by stating, "[t]he Court today
continues the evisceration of patronage practices begun in Elrod. . . . " 100 S. Ct.
at 1296 (Powell, J. dissenting) and concludes with, "the effect of the Court's decision will be to decrease the accountability and denigrate the role of our national
political parties." Id. at 1301.
65. Id. at 1299-1300.
66. Specifically, Justice Powell suggested that political parties allow candidates to obtain donations of time, aid in the implementation of a new officer's
policies, raise funds, recruit potential candidates, train party workers, provide assistance to voters, and act as a liaison between voters and governmental bureaucracies. Id. at 1300.
67. Id. at 1301, citing E. COSTIKYAN, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: POLITICS IN THE
PUBLIC INTEREST, at 353-54.

68. See J. Herbers, The Party's Over for Political Parties, The New York
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concerned that the decline of party strength, due to the limitations
on the use of patronage, would enable special interest groups such
as labor unions to exert more influence on political candidates. He
believed this would tend to make elected officials responsive only
to specialized needs of small groups. 9 However, there are those
who would disagree with Justice Powell's conclusion that the inroads into patronage will bring about the demise of political parties.7 0 The Constitution does not mandate the existence of two
main political parties. Therefore, their absence would not create a
question of constitutional proportion.
Another implication of the Branti decision is its possible, if
not probable, extension to patronage hirings as well as firings. The
plurality in Branti adopted the district court's observation that it
would be difficult at best to justify the use of party affiliation in
either the selection or retention of an assistant public defender.
Thus, it would appear that decisions by employers regarding employee selection or retention involve considerations of identical
factors. This extension of the Court's decision is noted and questioned by Justice Powell in his dissent." Justice Powell was primarily concerned with the constitutional implications of the extension. 7 3 However, it is doubtful that such an extension to patronage
Times Magazine, Dec. 9, 1979, p.175; D. Broder, THE PARTY'S OVER: THE FAILURE
OF POLITICS IN AMERICA, 239-40 (1972); W. BURNHAM, THE 1976 ELECTION: HAS
THE CRISIS BEEN ADJOURNED IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY? 1, 19-22

(W. Burnham and W. Weinberg, ed. 1978); Pomper, The Decline of the Party in
American Elections, 92 POL. Sci. Q. 40-41 (1977).
69. But see Note, 37 LOUISIANA L. REv. 990, 996 (1977); Note, 26 VAND. L.
REv. 1090, 1099 (1973); and Souraf, Patronageand Party, 3 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI.
115, 119 n.44 (1959) where the authors speculate on the amount and kind of support special interest groups will contribute to political parties.
70. The Court in Elrod stated the elimination of patronage practice, or the
halt of patronage dismissals would not cause political parties to disappear. 427
U.S. at 369.
71. 100 S. Ct. at 1295 n.14.
72. Justice Powell stated:
[t]he Court purports to limit the issue in this case to a dismissal of public employees ....

Yet the Court also states that it is difficult to formu-

late any justification for tying either the selection or retention of an assistant public defender to his party affiliation ....

If this latter

statement is not a holding of the Court, it at least suggests that the
Court perceives no constitutional distinction between selection and dismissal of public employees.
Id. at 1297 n.2 (Powell, J. dissenting).
73. Id.
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hirings would create an appreciable change in the operation of the
patronage system. The problems inherent in sustaining the burden
of proof are evident.74 The decision to hire must be based solely on
partisan considerations. Therefore, the successful litigation of such
an action is uncertain.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Branti squarely faced a long established practice that has been greatly in need of revision. Holding
that a public employee could not be discharged solely because of
his choice of political party, the Court severely curtailed the oppressive use of summary dismissals. The Court's decision would
seem to add greater stability to employment in the public sector.
The Court's extension of the Elrod decision will reach coercive
practices never before challenged. By the Court's reliance on the
first amendment for its holding, the actions of hiring authorities
will be subjected to a higher level of scrutiny. No longer will alleged interests in governmental efficiency automatically allow employers to infringe on employee's first amendment rights. The
Branti decision may even lead to an increase in governmental efficiency. Employees, who will not be replaced after elections, will
now be able to gain experience, even expertise, in their various positions. In any event, the Branti decision will extend to the public
employee that which most private employees have always had: the
understanding that retention of employment is dependent upon
job performance rather than political beliefs.
DIANE E. WAR

74. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 56, 196 n.50
(1976).

